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DRAFT
F'IRST
OF COMMON Y ARKETIS
ANTITRUST REGULATION
At a press conference ln Brussels on November 8, 1960r Hans von der
Groeben, a uember of the Commission of the European Economlc Cormunltyr eiK-
plained the drafE of a first reguLation under Artlcle 87 of the EEC Treaty(carLel regulatlon) 
" 
This flrst regulation, whlch contains a number of sub-
stantive and procedural provisions, is lntended to be a maJor step toward the
enforcement or Artlcles 85 and 86. (For text of Treaty articles referred to,
see addendum.)
Rules for New Cartels
The draft confirms that Ehe prohtbition laid do'*n in Article 85(1) shall
apply directly to all agreements, decisions or concerEed practices (in short,
carEels) establtshed after the reguLatlon becoues effective. Consequently,
no party to a new cartel w111 be able Eo invoke Ehe exetrption granted under
Artlcle 85(3) unless the Comlsslon has expllcitly declared the provislons of
ArElcle 85(1) to be lnappllcable. Such a declaration ls not made unl.ess
requested, and lt takes effect from Ehe date of decislon only. To prevenE a
belated declslon of the Connnisslon from causing delay in putEing a Permlsslble
cartel proJecE into practlce, the folIolvlng system has been devised: either
the Comlssion obJects to the projecE withln six months, when the enterprises
concerned can demand frou the Comlsston an early and reasoned decision under
Article 85(3) (from whlch appeal can be made to the Court of Justice), or the
Co'trmission does not ralse any obJection withtn slx monEhs, when the cartel nay
operate provlsionally untit the Coumisslon has reached a final decisLon. If
ln this decislon the Conmission eventually reJects Ehe request for the appll-
cation of Artlcle 85(3), the cartel oust cease t,o operaEe or be adapted to the
requirements of Article 85(3).
Under the draft, exemption will be granted for a limited time on1y, but
it can be extended provided the condltions required by ArEtcle 85(3) conttnue
to apply. In certaln cases exemption can be premaEurely revoked, thls applles
in particular where it has been obtained fraudulently or by incorrect statetrentE.
In order to insure unlform applicatlon of the law, the draft confers on
the Cornmlsslon the excluslve competence - subJect to accept,ance by the Court
of Justice - to declare the provlsions of Artlcle 85(1) to be lnapplieable, or
ln oEher words to grant exeupt,ion from the prohlbltion of cartels laid dotun
by the Treaty. For the rest, the draft does not affect the cotrpetence vesEed
ln the national authorities under Artlcle 88 of che Treaty to proceed agalnst
prohlbited cartels.
Rules for Existing Cartels
A provlslonal arrangeneDt is envisaged for carEels already ln existence
when the regulatlon cones lnto effect. Thle is necessary because not all mem-
ber states have provided a procedure by whlch a national adroinlstrative auth-
ortty could be requested to grant an exemptlon under Article 85(3) of the
Treaty. This provisional arrangement will, ooreover, enable the Commlssion
to collect lnformation on existing cartels so chat it nay investlgate their
lqortance for the establishrnent of the Conrmon Market and declde on Ehelr
conpatiblltty wieh the Treaty.
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The draft regulation therefore makes it compulsory for certain types of 
existing cartels to be registered. Registration with the Commission must be 
effected within six months of the entry into force of the regulation. So as 
to remove any doubts on what cartels are subject to compulsory registration, 
the draft lists the following characteristics: 
1. All cartels which have as their object or result the regula-
tion of imports and exports among the member states, 
2. Any cartels which embrace enterprises from at least two 
member states and have as their object or result within 
the Common Market - the direct or indirect fixing of 
min~, maximum or fixed prices for goods or services; 
the restriction of production, sales or investments; 
the sharing of markets within the Common Market by areas, 
customers or other characteristics. 
The following are not subject to compulsory registration: price maintenance 
contracts, license contracts, and agreements for exclusive dealing. This means 
that a large number of restrictions on competition which come under Article 
85(1) are not subject to registration. 
An exemption under Article 85(3) can be applied for in respect of all 
cartels registered. If such an application is made within six months, the 
prohibition under Article 85(1) is suspended. Where the Commission eventually 
rejects the application, it will grant the cartel a period in which to adjust 
itself to the rules or to dissolve itself. On the expiration of this period 
the prohibition under Article 85(1) will take effect. Cartels where the appli-
cation envisaged in the draft is not made expose themselves to the legal risks 
involved in an infringement of the Treaty. If they fall within the provisions 
of Article 85(lb they are null and void, and no previous decision by the 
Commission is required. Old cartels not subject to registration will be con• 
sidered provisionally compatible with Article 85, provided an exemption under 
Article 85(3) is applied for within three years. This relatively long period 
will enable the Commission to deal with the most tmportant cartels first. 
It does not, however, mean that the cartel prohibition is held up until expira~ 
tion of the ttme periods. The Commission may well decide at an earlier stage 
that a cartel is not compatible with Article 85(1). 
Penalty Provisions 
The draft contains further provisions enabling the Commission to carry 
out its own investigations in close cooperation with the member states. The 
legitimate clatms of those concerned to enjoy the protection offered by the law 
have been taken very fully into account. 
The regulation authorizes the Commission to tmpose fines and penalties. 
Fines ranging from 100 to 5,000 units of account (each unit is equal to $1) 
can be imposed where the compulsory registration of old cartels is disregarded,. 
where applications contain false or distorted statements, where information is 
given incorrectly or not within the stipulated period, or where, in the case 
of investigations, business records are not fully supplied or an investigation 
that has been ordered is resisted. By fixing penalties, the Commission can 
prevail upon enterprises to register as required, to submit complete and correct 
information, ~d to accept investigations ordered as part of a decision. 
Penalties ranging from 50 to 1,000 units of account may be fixed for each day 
of delay. 
the first regulation does not yet provide sanctions in respect of infringe-
ments of Articles 85 and 86; nevertheless, the Commission can oblige enter-
prises to cease any violation of these articles once it has been established. 
Compliance with such a decision is enforced by means of penalties. In the case 
of action brought against any decision of the Commission to tmpose a fine or 
penalty, the Court of Justice is fully authorized to investigate the decision 
in accordance with Article 172 of the Treaty. It can rescind, reduce or increase 
the fine or penalty imposed. 
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Coordlnatlon tlith. NaElona1 Gover,nnents
The regulatlon ls deslgned to Lnsure Ehe continuance of the present close
cooperation between the Corrnlsston and the cartel authorities tn the nerober
statesr Before the Comlssion takes a decislon, lt must consult the naElonal
auEhorities, ruho are also kept tnforued durlng the proceedings of any applica-
tLons submi.tted and of any fuoportant adnlntstratlve acts of the Comisslon.
Finally, the regulatlon contains provisions on secrecy and on what decisions
of the Conmisslon may be publlshed.
The first draft does nothlng to anticlpaEe the posslble iesue of further
provlelons on conpeEence and procedure. No declslon has yet been taken as to
wtrether and tn what way a consultative cornmlttee is to be brought lnto the
cartel procedure. A later regulatLon will deal lnter alla wlth the lnpositlon
of fines for lnfrlngenents of Areicles 85 and 86.
Wlth regard to the application of Article 86, the regulatlon provldes the
Bame powers to put, an end to any lnfrlngenent and the same authorlEy Eo order
lnvestigatLon, revtsion, or sancEions as tn the case of Artlcle 85. Thls shows
that Artlcle 86 ls considered no less tuporEant than Article 85. Nevertheless,
iE 1s left to the lnstltutlons of the Comunity to issue detalled regulations
under Artlcle 86, taklng lnto account the difference between Artlcle 85 and
ArtlcLe 86, lnasmuch as the latter does no Bore than prohlblt the abuse of a
dominant posltlon on the oarket.
Adherence to ArticLe 86 can be enforced through decisions taken by the
Comtsslon.
Texts of the pertlnent arElcles of the EEC Treaty referred to above:
Artlcle 85
1. The followlng shall be deemed to be lncoupaElble with the Conrmon Market and
shalL hereby be prohlbited: any agreenent between enterprises, any declslons
by associatlons of enterprl.ses and any concerted practlces which are llkely to
affect trade between the t"lenber States and which have as thelr obJecc or result
the preventlon, restrlctlon or distortlon of competitlon wlthin the Cornmon
I,Iarket, ln partlcular those conslsEing ln:
(a) the dlrect or indlrect flxing of purchase or selllng prlces or of any
other tradtng condlttons;
(b) the limltation or control of productlon, markets, technLcal develop-
ment or investtrent;
(c) narket-sharing or the sharlng of sources of supply;
(d) the appllcatlon to partles to transactlons of unequal terms in
respect of equivalent supplies, thereby placlng them at a conpetlttve disad-
vantage; or
(e) the subJectlng of the concluelon of a eontract to the accePtance by
a party of additional suppltes whtch, elEher by their nature or according to
comerclal usage, have no connectlon wlth the subJect of such contract.
2. Any agreeuents or declsLons prohtbited pursuant to Ehis Artlcle shall be
null and vold.
3, Nevertheless, the provislons of paragraph 1 may be declared lnappllcable
in the case of:
any agreeEents or classes of agteements between enterprises,
--any declsions or classes of declslons by assoclations of enterprLses, ad
-any concerted practtces or classes of concerted practlceo which contrlbute
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to the improrrenent of the productlon or dlstrlbutlon of goods or to the prono-
tton of technlcal or econoEnic progress $rhlle reservlng to users an equrcable
share tn the proftt resultlng therefrom, and whlch:
(a) neither lmpose on the enterprises concerned any restrtctlons not
lndispensable to the attalnment of the above obJectlves;
(b) nor enable such enEerprises Eo elinlnate conpetitlon ln respect of a
substantial proportion of the goods concerned,
Article 86
To the extent Eo which trade between any Merober StaEes may be affected
thereby, actlon by one or more enterprlses to take irproper advantage of a
domlnant positlon wlthln the Conrmon MarkeE or wlthin a substantlal part of it
shall be deened to be lncompatlble with the Conmon Market and shall hereby be
prohlbited.
Such lnproper practlces may, ln particular, conslst ln:
(a) the dlrect or lndirecL lmposltlon of any lnequitable purchase or
setllng prices or of any other lnequitable tradtng conditlons;
(b) the limltatLon of production, markets or Eechnlcal development Eo the
preJudlce of constmers;
(c) the applicatlon to parties to transactlons of unequal terns ln respect
of equlvalent supplles, thereby placing them at a coryetltlve dlsadvantage; or
(d) the subJecting of the qonclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by
a party, of addttlonal supplies whlch, elther by their nature or accordlng to
conrnerclal usage, have no connection with the subJect of such contract.
Article 87
1. Wlthin a period of three years after the date of the entry lnto force of thls
Treaty, the Counctl, actlng by neans of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the
Cornnisslon and after the Assembly has been consulted, shal1 lay down an] appro-
prlate regulatlons or dlrectives with a vlew to the appllcatlon of the prlnctples
set out ln Artlcles 85 and 85.
If such provlsions have not been adopted wtthin Ehe above-EentLoned Eine-
llmlt, they sha11 be laid dorm by the Counell actlng by rneans of a quallfied
naJority vote on a proposal. of the Cornnl.sslon and after the Assenbly has been
consulted.
2. The provlslons referred to ln paragraph 1 shalI be designed, in parElcular:
(a) to ensure observance, by the instltutlon of flnes or penaltles, of the
prohtbltlons referred to in Article 85, paragraph 1, and in Article 85;
(b) to deteraine the partlculars of the appllcatlon of Article 85, para-
graph 3, taking due account of the need, on the one hand, of ensurlng effective
supenrtslon and, on the other hand, of slnplifying admlnistratlve control to Ehe
greatest posstble extent;
(c) to speclfy, where necessary, the scope of applicaElon ln the various
economic sectors of the provislons contalned ln Articles 85 and 86;
(d) to deflne the respective responslbilities of the Comlsston and of the
Court of Justlce ln the appllcatlon of the provlslons referred co ln this para-
graph; and(e) to deflne the relations between, on the one hand, munlelpal law and,
on the other hand, the provlsLona contalned ln thLs Section or adopted ln appllca-
tlon of thls ArEtcle.
Artlcle 172
The regulattons lald down by the Gouncll pursuant to the provisions of thls
Treaty may confer on the Court of Justlce fulL Jurlsdiction ln resPect of penal-
ttes provlded for ln such regulatlons.
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